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In April 14, Idaho Police pulled Garcia-Rodriguez over for purportedly 
committing a traffic offense, detained him for over an hour, arrested him for driving without a 
""'"'"'--'"'· and then searched him incident to his arrest. The district court granted tv1r. Garcia-
Rodriguez's motion to suppress all of the evidence against him because the Idaho State Police 
no reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez, unlawfully prolonged his detention, 
and had no probable cause to mTest him. The State appeals from the district court's order 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to suppress, and argues that the stop, detention, and 
search incident to arrest were lawful. The State's cursory and conclusory argument fails to show 
that the district court erred. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
One in April 2014, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez exited I-84 in County. 
(R., p.175.) Trooper Otto exited the highway behind him, as seen in a video taken by Trooper 
Otto's dash camera. (Id; State's Ex. to 6/3/2014 Motion to Suppress Hearing.) Trooper Otto 
saw Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez cross the right fog line by roughly the width of his tires as 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez drove on the off-ramp. (R., p.175.) Trooper Otto was supposedly 
concerned that he was impaired or was having vehicle issues, and so Trooper Otto pulled him 
over. (R., p.176.) 
At I: 16 p.m., Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez parked his car directly in front of a gas station 
convenience store, and Trooper Otto pulled in right behind him. (Id) As Trooper Otto 
approached Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car, Trooper Otto noticed a Hertz rental sticker in the back 
contact 
a ) 
told that he stopped him for line, 
never investigated whether Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was impaired or having car 
troubles. (Id.) When Trooper Otto asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez for his driver's license, 
Garcia-Rodriguez gave him his Mexican consular identification listed a 
Gooding, Idaho (Id) Trooper Otto Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez what his name was, 
and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez truthfully responded "Victor." (R., pp.176-77.) He told Trooper Otto 
that the car belonged to his friend, Bill. (R., p.177.) Trooper Otto asked for the registration 
and insurance, which Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez could not find. (R., p.177.) Trooper Otto thought 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez \Vas avoiding 
asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez to look in 
said no. (Id.) 
center console of the car because, when Trooper Otto 
center console, he opened it "a closed it, 
Trooper Otto Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez to get out of the car: "I that wasn't 
being truthful with me ... I had him the vehicle just in case any weapons or the chance of 
him driving off .... " (Id.) According to the district court, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez could not have 
driven off because Trooper Otto's car blocked him in. (R., p.176.) Further, the court found that 
"the request to exit the vehicle \Vas not for the purpose of investigating a DUI and there was no 
indication [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] was intoxicated." (R., p.177.) Otto then requested 
that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez empty his pockets. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez took a cell phone, 
wallet, and set of keys from his pockets and showed them to Trooper Otto. (Id.) Trooper Otto 
2 
to a and to a s 
not ever to 
com1. (Id.) According to Trooper Otto, the Idaho State Police are told not to look up that 
information, even though it is readily available. (Id.) 
Trooper Otto then went into the gas station to ask if anyone spoke Spanish so that they 
could translate. (Id) When Trooper Otto returned, he asked Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez how long he 
had the car, and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez said he went to visit his mother. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-
Rodriguez also denied having any drugs, including methamphetamine, in the car. (Id.) Just as 
Trooper Otto asked whether he could search for himself, Hope Tappan approached Trooper Otto 
to translate for him. (Id.) Trooper Otto explained, through Ms. Tappan, that he stopped 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez for crossing the white line and "immediately ask[ed] for consent to search 
the vehicle." (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez said that Trooper Otto could search the car, and that he 
was going to buy a car in Falls. (R., 179.) 
At that point, Ms. Tappan left, and Trooper Otto searched the car. (Id.) Trooper Otto 
went directly to the center console, and found approximately $10,000 in cash inside of a shaving 
kit. (Id.) Trooper Otto then placed Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez in handcuffs and put Mr. Garcia-
Rodriguez in Trooper Otto's patrol car, but stated that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was not under 
arrest. (Id.) Trooper Otto said he was going to find Ms. Tappan to translate. (Id.) Instead, 
Trooper Otto continued to search the shaving kit, and a few minutes later four more officers 
arrived on scene. (Id.) 
1 According to Trooper Otto, the El Paso Intelligence Center consolidates information reported 
by various agencies throughout the country. (R., p.178.) 
3 
consent was no 
a 
fail to appear court (Id.) Otto dispatch to contact Hertz for permission 
to the car, and learned that the car was rented by Bill Walker. (R., p.180.) officers 
talked about the cash they found in the car as "bundled not how people get cash ... it's 
bundled like a drug dealer." (Id.) Finally, the officers agreed that if Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez were 
to waive ownership of the money, they could it and "'cut him loose."' (Id.) 
A Spanish-speaking officer, Trooper Anderson, then A1irandized Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez 
began asking him questions. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez explained that the money was 
just received a tax return for about $5,000, had been saving money, and participated in a 
"tanda" through his work. (R., pp.180-81.) The officers believed the tanda vvas a form of illegal 
gambling, and so Trooper Anderson began asking Garcia-Rodriguez questions about how it 
who pai1icipated, the tanda (R., p.181.) "tanda" is in a 
of community saving system, not a form gambling. (R., p.181 n.11.) Trooper Otto then 
decided to seize the money because he thought defendant was lying about where he got the 
money and said that ifit was actually his money, he should "prove it." (R., p.181.) 
Trooper Otto then got his drug dog out of his patrol car and walked the dog around 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car. (Id.) Trooper Otto said the dog alerted but it was "really weak" and 
then that ''the dog alerted but didn't indicate." (R., pp.181-82.) The officers speculated that 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez had just dropped off drugs-they called it the "popcorn effect." 
(R., p.182.) The police never found any drugs in Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's car. (Id.) 
4 
At 2:30 for to a 
) For 
,.,.,,,...,,,. Otto claimed had noticed a "bulge" in Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's pocket from the 
beginning. (Id.) Trooper Otto never mentioned that to any of the other officers, nor did he ask 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez about it. (Id.) 
The State later charged Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez with methamphetamine trafficking and 
possession of paraphernalia (R., pp.49-50), and Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress 
all of the evidence against him (R., p.69). 
The district court granted the motion, finding that the stop, continued detention, and 
arrest were all unlawful. (R., pp.204-206.) The district court's decision was grounded in its 
distrust of Trooper Otto and its disapproval of the officers' reliance on unfounded assumptions 
and stereotypes in interacting with Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez. Specifically, the court found: 
"Trooper Otto exited the highway with some purpose-Trooper Otto passes a 
vehicle heading eastbound at ,vhat appears to be great speed and exits the 
interstate almost directly through the right hand lane. In doing so, it appears 
to the Court he is already focused on [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's] vehicle." 
(R., p.175 n.1.) 
~ "At no point during the entire duration of detention did [Trooper] Otto ask any 
questions directed at whether [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] ,vas impaired or if the 
vehicle was having issues-concerns that Trooper Otto stated he had prior to 
stopping [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez]." (R., p.176 n.2.) 
• "At 1 :43 the officers discuss how they can search the vehicle, as it is unlikely 
the consent is still valid with [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] detained. It is suggested 
that [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] could be arrested for 'failure to purchase' and the 
officers could subsequently do an inventory on the car. At this time there is 
no discussion of factors leading the officers to believe [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] 






connected in any fashion with drugs or illegal activity." (R., p.180 n.9.) 
• "Trooper Otto, at the mention of a tax return, fixated on this issue, 
disbelieving that [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] would receive a tax return because 
of his illegal status and if he did there should be paper vvork. . . . This belief is 
an unfounded conclusion .... Additionally, if [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] did 
receive a tax return it would be incredibly improbable that he would carry his 
tax return with him." (R., p.181 n.10.) 
• "Trooper Otto testified that he did not say that the alert was weak. However 
this Court finds that he did after review of the video. This statement is clear 
and loud (unlike when other officers are speaking to Trooper Otto) and the 
voice is consistent with Trooper Otto's throughout the video." (R., p.182 
n.12.) 
• "It is easy to look at this case and conclude, vvhat's the problem?-the police 
caught a drug trafficker. That, ordinarily, would translate to good police 
work. That is not the problem. The problem in this case is each and every 
aspect of this case before the police discovered the drugs." (R., p.197 n.25.) 
The State timely appealed, arguing that the stop, detention, and search incident arrest 




of of a suppression motion is a 
a to suppress is challenged, v.-e accept the trial court's findings 
which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. At a suppression hearing, the 
po,ver to assess the credibility of \Vitnesses, res0I,1e factual conflicts, \Veigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. 
v. Cutler, I Idaho 297, 301 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal 
district court correctly Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's motion to suppress all 
evidence seized in this case because the stop, prolonged detention, search incident to arrest 
were unlawful. By glossing over or ignoring of the district key factual findings and 
legal conclusions, the State has failed to provide this Court with any substantiated reason to 
reverse the district court has failed to preserve many of the arguments to support 
its position. State has not shown that the district court erred by granting Mr. Garcia-
to so this 
The United Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches seizures. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v. 
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure falls \Vithin a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement was reasonable in light of surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 219; Schrnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds 
in 1vfissouri v. A1cNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. If the 
government fails to meet its burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or 
8 
V. 371 1 11, 9 
Trooper Otto Stopped Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez Without Reasonable Suspicion 
must generally be 
based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
1 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). However, limited investigatory detentions such as traffic stops are 
permissible when "justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime.'' State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). 
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences 
that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the 
of the circumstances knmvn to 
and quotations omitted). 
officer at or before the of the stop." Id. (internal 
The district court found that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion justified the 
stop in this case. (R., pp.183-191.) The district court dismissed LC.§ 49-808 as a justification 
for the stop because, contrary to the State's contention, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez used his turn 
signals properly. (R., pp.187-88.) The court also found that '·the State failed to even argue that 
[Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez violated] LC. §§ 49-637 and 49-630," but concluded that 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez did not violate those statutes when he crossed the fog line on a single-lane 
off-ramp. (R., p.187.) The court further found that briefly crossing the fog line, initially 
signaling right, and then signaling left, did not give rise to a reasonable susp1c10n that 
9 
Garcia-Rodriguez 
§ 49-630, and State v. 41 
or was car 
Idaho 293 (Ct App. 2001), 
2014 WL 5151426 (Ct. App. 15, 201 
(reversed by State v. Neal, 362 P.3d 514 (2015)),2 which discusses LC.§ 49-637.3 (App. Brief, 
pp.5-6.) But the State has not claimed, alone argued, that the district court incorrectly 
LC. §§ 49-630 49-637 as inapplicable to single-lane off-ramps. 
Regardless, the district court correctly found that neither probable cause nor reasonable 
suspicion supported the stop. plain language of I.C. §§ 49-630 and 49-637 applies 
only to highways with two or nwre lanes. (R., pp.185-87.) LC. § 49-637(1) provides that 
any highway has been divided two (2) or more clearly lanes for traffic 
... [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a and shall not 
with safety." the Idaho Supreme 
highway has been divided into two 
applies to highways with at least two 
that movement can 
concluded in Neal, "the plain meaning of 'whenever 
or more clearly marked lanes' is statute only 
of travel and excludes one-lane roads." Neal, 
P.3d at 521. LC. § 49-630(1)(d) provides that: "Upon all highways of sufficient width a 
2 The Court of Appeals in Neal held that driving on, but not across, a fog line violated the 
requirement that a vehicle remain within its lane. Neal, 2014 WL 5151426. Mr. Garcia-
Rodriguez moved to suspend this appeal pending the Idaho Supreme Court's review of Neal. 
The Idaho Supreme Court decided that case in November, holding that "driving onto but not 
across the line marking the right edge of the road does not violate Idaho Code section 49-637." 
Neal, 362 P.3d at 522. 
3 The State did not argue there was probable cause to justify the stop, nor did the State argue that 




on of the is of a the 
words, there must be two or more lanes running in opposite directions for LC. § 49-630(1) to 
apply. Indeed, the purpose of these statutes is to "manag[ e] traffic safety vis-a-vis other 
vehicles." Neal, 362 P.3d at 520 ("The fact that this portion of Idaho's motor vehicle code 
contains all the rules relating to rights of way and safety management regarding other vehicles 
supports the construction that section 49-637(1) regulates the interaction of traffic between 
lanes, not a driver's interaction with the sidewalk, curb, or shoulder."). Because Mr. Garcia-
Rodriguez undisputedly crossed the fog line on a single-lane, one-way off-ramp, neither 
LC.§§ 49-637(1) or 49-630(1) applies, and Trooper Otto had no reasonable suspicion to stop 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez. 
For this same reason, the State's reliance on Slater is misplaced.4 The Slater Court held 
that the police had reasonable suspicion that violated I § 49-630(1) because Slater's 
tires crossed the fog line on an on-ramp as he entered a highway. Slater, 136 Idaho at 296, 298. 
But it appears Slater did not make the argument that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez makes here-that 
I.C. § 49-630(1) does not apply in the first place because Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was on a single-
lane, one-way off-ramp when he crossed the fog line. Indeed, there is no evidence one way or 
the other whether the on-ramp in Slater had a single lane or multiple lanes, though the Court 
explained that the exceptions in I.C. § 49-630(1), which include "a highway restricted to one-
4 Again, as explained above, the State did not cite to I.C. § 49-630 in its briefing below. 
(R., pp.79-87, 117-22.) And on appeal, the State has not challenged the district court's finding 
that LC. § 49-630 did not apply to a single-lane off-ramp, and did not cite to Slater for the 
proposition that I.C. § 49-630 in fact applies to single-lane off-ramps. (App. Br., pp.5-6.) 
11 
not ' 1 at not 
not l ), 
no stop. failed to show that the district comi 
by finding that stop was not supported suspicion, and 
the district court correctly suppressed the evidence seized as a result. 
B. 
If a person is detained, scope of their detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification. 
(Ct. App. 2008). An 
necessary to effectuate 
, 460 U.S. at 500; see also State v. Grantham, 1 Idaho 490, 496 
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is 
of the stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; see also Grantham, 
146 Idaho at "Authority for [a] thus when to the infraction are-or 
reasonably should 
(2015) (internal 
should be the least 
States, 135 Ct. 1609, 1614 
omitted) (emphasis added). "[T]he investigative methods employed 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion 
in a short period of time." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. 
An officer "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful stop. But 
.. he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily 
demanded to justify detaining an individual." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (internal citations 
omitted); see also Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496. Therefore, officers can only expand "the length 
and scope of the initial investigatory detention ... if there exist objective and specific articulable 
12 
reasonable suspicion the or 1s 
V. 
court found to 
unreasonable because Trooper Otto prolonged the stop longer than necessary to issue a citation 
for a driving infraction and because there was no reason to believe Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was, 
had been, or was about to engage in a crime. (R., p.192.) 
The State has not listed the prolonged detention as an issue in this case,5 and made only 
t\VO statements regarding the prolonged detention.6 First, in a header, the State claims that "The 
Continued Detention And Eventual Arrest Of Garcia Was Supported By Probable Cause." (App. 
p.6.) The State later claims that the "[a]pplication of relevant legal standards show 
Trooper Otto almost immediately developed probable cause of a new crime, driving without a 
license, which justified Garcia's continued detention." (App. Brief p.8.) By failing to support 
these bald conclusions with the relevant legal standards and argument, the State has waived the 
issue. v. Zichko, 1 Idaho 263 (1996) ("When on 
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
5 The Issue in the Appellant's Briefis: "Did the district court err by suppressing because the stop 
was justified by reasonable suspicion, the arrest was justified by probable cause, and the search 
of Garcia's person was proper incident to arrest? 
6 In a footnote, the State posits that "[i]t appears that the district comi concluded that the consent 
leading to discovery of the cash was involuntary based on the court's conclusion there was an 
illegal detention." (App. Brief, p.7 n.l.) But then the State goes on to argue that consent given 
during a lawful detention does not demonstrate coercion, and that the circumstances as a whole 
did not evidence coercion. (Id) The State has missed the point. If Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's 
prolonged detention was not lawful (and the State has failed to give this Court any authority or 
argument for why it was lawful), then any evidence obtained during that unlawful detention, 
regardless of whether the circumstances were otherwise coercive, is inadmissible. See State v. 
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 653 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A consent to search given during an illegal 
detention is tainted by the illegality and is therefore ineffective.") (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 507-
08). State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 87 4 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Consent to search does not expunge 
the taint of unlawful police activity where the events are irrevocably intertwined."). 
13 
... A an IS 
transcript record "). citations to the authorities, statutes 
Moreover, the district court correctly 
Garcia-Rodriguez was unlawful: 
that Trooper Otto's prolonged detention of 
Because Trooper Otto's only justification for stopping [Mr. Garcia-
Rodriguez] was to issue, at best, a citation for some driving and that 
objective, along with any additional citation for Failing to Purchase a Driver's 
License, could have reasonably been accomplished by 1 :26 p.m. !Just before 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez gave Trooper Otto consent to search his car], any 
continued detention, without further evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity 
(which there was none), unlawfully expanded the scope and purpose of the stop. 
(R., p.195.) 
If Trooper Otto wished to issue Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez a citation, could and should 
have done so long before 1 :26 p.m. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct at 161 Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; 
146 at 496. The was in 
no aimed at determining Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was likely to appear in court-
"[q]uite frankly, an inquiry never (R., p.194)-and there was no other 
legitimate reason to extend the length of the stop. See Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 614-15. The 
district court correctly all as a result of the prolonged detention. 
A search incident to a lawful arrest is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 815. warrantless arrest and warrantless search incident to 
that arrest is lawful if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has 
14 
a at 817. cause 1s a man 
an 
" (1 
LC.§ 49-1407 provides: 
Whenever any person is halted by a peace officer for any misdemeanor 
,,riolation of the pro\risions of this title and is not required to be take11 before a 
magistrate, the person shall, in the discretion of the officer, either be given a 
traffic citation or be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper magistrate 
... in the following cases: 
(1) When the person not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or 
when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will 
disregard a written promise to appear in court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The district court found that 
Rodriguez for failure to purchase a license 
to believe 
Otto had no probable cause to arrest Mr. Garcia-
'"'""u"" Trooper Otto had no reasonable and probable 
would to court. (R., pp.199-204.) The 
court Trooper Otto's subjective belief Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was dishonest as 
substantial amount of information" that objectively unreasonable; the officers a 
officers learned about Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez and his ties to the area, made absolutely no 
to investigate whether Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was telling the truth, "intentionally 
turned a blind to information on the most pressing issue they had to determine-whether 
[Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] was likely to appear." (R., pp.200-03.) Because there were no 
and grounds to would not appear, there was 
no probable cause for his arrest. 
The State argues, for the first on appeal, that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's arrest was 
lawful under Virginia v. },1oore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), simply because he drove without a license. 
(App. 7.) Because the not that 
15 
court 
identification, spoke little English, was not in law enforcement 
databases, was driving a car by someone else, and had bricks of cash Trooper Otto 
associated with drug trafficking," Trooper Otto had grounds to arrest because he was not likely 
to appear for court.7 (App. Brief, p.7 (citing I.C. § 49-1407).) As the district court found, those 
circumstances have little or no bearing on the analysis, are outweighed by the evidence that 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez would appear in court, and are undennined by the officers' utter failure to 
actually investigate Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was likely to appear. (R., pp.200-04.) 
Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's Mexican consular identification listed Mr. Gonzalez's real name 
and a Gooding , and Trooper Otto had no reason to believe the identification was 
falsified. (Id.) Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's immigration status and inability to speak English do not 
that was not likely to given that openly acknowledged was 111 
the country illegally and said had lived and worked the area for over a decade. 
(See R., p.202.) That Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was not found 111 law enforcement databases is 
neither remarkable nor indicative that he would fail to appear-again, the officers knew from the 
beginning that he was in the country illegally, and the databases did not reveal outstanding arrest 
\Varrants or criminal convictions. (See id.) As for the rental car, Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez 
explained to Trooper Otto that he borrowed the car from his friend Billy to visit his family. 
7 The State cites to LC. § 49-1407(1) generally, so it is unclear whether the State also intends to 
argue that the arrest was warranted based on unsatisfactory identification. To the extent the State 
intends to argue as much, the district court recognized that the State failed to make that argument 




m none it was 
(See pp.200, 202.) Finally, Garcia-Rodriguez's mere possession of cash, 
more, does not mean he was associated with drug trafficking. (See R., p.201.) The 
court found as much (R., p.196-97), and the State has failed to challenge (let alone 
mention) that finding App. Br.). Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez gave the officers a reasonable 
explanation both regarding how he got the money and why he had so much money with him. 
Despite Trooper Otto's concerns that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez was lying, Trooper Otto 
no effort to confirm or disprove Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez's story or to determine whether he 
fact worked at the Big Sky Dairy, had lived in area for over a decade, and had family and 
was 
in the area. (See R., pp.201-02.) Instead, the turned a blind eye to 
on the most pressing issue they to determine-whether [Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez] 
p.203.) to appear." 
court found that Trooper Otto's subjective that Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez 
would fail to appear was objectively unreasonable and the State has failed to otherwise. 
Therefore, there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Garcia-Rodriguez and the district court 




the evidence "F,'-""'J' him. 
DATED this 15th January, 2016. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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